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Protest Voting and Political Stalemate
ALESSANDRO CHIARAMONTE, NICOLA MAGGINI
As in 2006, the recent elections were very close. But, unlike in 2006, the 2013 elec-
tion reached a stalemate. Pierluigi Bersani’s center-left coalition won in the Chamber 
of deputies by only a 0.4% vote margin against Silvio Berlusconi’s center-right. 
However, thanks to the electoral system, the winning coalition enjoys a substantial 
majority of seats. Not so in the Senate where the center-left is still the coalition that 
got a plurality of the popular vote, but the different electoral system from that of the 
Chamber did not translate it into a majority of seats. This is in a nutshell the outcome 
of the 2013 elections in Italy. 
Indeed, the widespread expectation was that the center-left would win with a larger 
margin. Most of the polls had indicated a consistently favourable trend supportive of 
Bersani’s coalition up to the last few days before the vote. What happened at the ballot 
box on February24th and 25th is still an enigma to some extent. In this article we will try to 
give a preliminary explanation, analyzing the election background, the electoral systems, 
the result of the vote, its geographical articulation, the individual vote shifts, and the 
socio-demographic profile of the voters. Concluding remarks summarize the findings.
Election Background
In the previous election of 2008 the victory of Berlusconi’s center-right coalition 
was almost a landslide and its parties could enjoy a large parliamentary majority both 
in the Chamber of Deputies and in the Senate. It was actually the largest majority for a 
coalition in the Second Republic. After the election Berlusconi formed a cabinet which 
appeared to be the strongest ever in the Italian political history. Not only because of 
its solid parliamentary majority, but also because it consisted of only two parties, with 
Berlusconi’s party – the Popolo della libertà (PdL, People of freedom) – being by far 
larger than the second one, that is the Lega Nord (LN, Northern league). Few weeks 
after the formation of his cabinet, Berlusconi’s popularity was at its highest. Then it 
started to slowly go down, but it remained high – compared to the leaders of other 
countries – for some time even after the start of the economic crisis. 
However, in the long run Berlusconi’s popularity declined constantly for three main 
reasons1. The first is the worsening of the financial and economic crisis. When the prospects 
of a Greek default became real, Italy fell under the spotlight too and international investors 
reassessed the risk on its sovereign debt. This led to a sharp increase of the interests paid 
on the bonds issued to finance the debt, that would have not been sustainable for much 
longer. The second reason has to do with the sexual scandals related to Berlusconi’s 
1 Alessandro CHIARAMONTE, Roberto D’ALIMONTE, ”The Twilight of the Berlusconi 
Era: Local Elections and National Referendums in Italy, May and June 2011”, South European 
Society and Politics, vol. 17, 2012, pp. 261-279.
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private life. In 2009, his wife filed for divorce and publicly accused her husband of 
”consorting with minors” after he attended the 18th birthday party of an unknown young 
girl. The same year an ”escort” woman revealed that she and many other girls were paid 
to attend parties at Berlusconi’s residence. Finally, in 2010 Berlusconi was involved in 
the ”Rubygate”. Accused of having sex with an underage prostitute and for abuse of 
office relating to her release from detention, Berlusconi was later placed under criminal 
investigation. The third reason explaining the declining popularity of Berlusconi is the 
shrinking of his cabinet’s parliamentary base, that became evident when Gianfranco Fini 
– speaker of the Chamber and co-founder of the PdL together with Berlusconi– left the 
PdL and formed a new political party, called Futuro e libertà per l’Italia (FLI, Future and 
freedom for Italy), against Berlusconi himself.
In November 2011 Berlusconi was at his lowest level of popularity and the 
financial crisis was at its highest level since 2008. Left without the support of a stable 
parliamentary majority, Berlusconi was forced to resign. He was replaced by Mario 
Monti, a well-known and internationally respected economic professor, who formed a 
technocratic emergency cabinet supported by parties from all political options, namely 
the leftist Partito democratico (PD, Democratic party), the centrist FLI and Unione di 
centro (UDC, Union of the center), and the rightist PdL. Only the LN and later Italia 
dei valori (IDV, Italy of values) were against. The new cabinet introduced an austerity 
package to restore markets confidence and the financial stability of the country. The 
economic measures implemented by the cabinet ranged from the pension reform to 
the labour market reform, from spending cuts to an increase in taxes. One year after 
the installation of the cabinet, the financial situation of the country appeared to be 
eventually under control. However, Berlusconi’s PdL opportunistically withdrew 
its support to the technocratic cabinet on December 4, 2012, and attacked Monti’s 
economic policies as too austere and dictated by Merkel’s Germany. On 21 December 
2012, Monti resigned as prime minister and forced elections a few months earlier 
than planned. Few days afterwards, Monti announced he would participate in the 
incoming general elections as the leader of a centrist coalition. 
The electoral campaign saw four main political players – three coalitions and one 
independent party list – fiercely fighting each other. The center-left coalition led by 
Pierluigi Bersani and consisting of three main party lists – PD, Sinistra ecologia e libertà 
(SEL, Left, ecology and freedom), and Centro democratico (CD, Democratic center) – 
was expected to emerge with the most votes and lead a new cabinet, probably backed 
by Monti. Bersani, who had supported Monti’s cabinet until the very end, hoped to 
present himself as the candidate most fit to govern the country. His campaign was, 
however, largely uninspiring and ultimately unsuccessful.
The main party lists of the center-right coalition were the PdL, the LN, and 
the new Fratelli d’Italia (FDI, Brothers of Italy). For the sixth consecutive election, 
Berlusconi ran as the coalition leader. He led an electoral campaign heavily focused 
on TV appearances and radio interviews. Despite the fact that he had guaranteed his 
support for Monti’s cabinet over the past year, Berlusconi fiercely went on to attack 
his work and offered instead numerous eye-catching measures, such as a property tax 
(known as ”Imu”) refund.
As for the incumbent prime minister, Monti decided to found his own political 
party, Scelta civica (SC, Civic choice), and formed a centrist coalition together with 
UDC and FLI. The three parties ran with their own distinct lists in the elections for 
the Chamber. They had a different choice for the election for the Senate, where they 
ran with a joint list called Con Monti per l’Italia, so as to increase their chances to 
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surmount the threshold of representation in each region (”only” 8% for an individual 
list compared to 20% for a coalition).
The fourth main political actor to contest the 2013 election was the Movimento 5 
stelle (M5S, Five star movement), an anti-establishment party created by Beppe Grillo, 
a comedian who had only been active in politics for 4-5 years, but who had quickly 
earned widespread popularity thanks to his blog. Grillo led his campaign mainly 
through Internet and in the public squares. In his speeches he criticized corrupt 
politicians, financial speculation, tax collectors, drawing support from a growing 
number of angry people who asked him to ”send them all home”, referring to the 
current members of Parliament and political parties1.
The date of the elections was set for February 24, and 25. Most of the polls 
indicated that the coalition of Bersani was in the lead up to the last few days before 
the vote. However, its margin of lead had decreased remarkably since the beginning 
of the campaign. Whether the center-left would receive a majority of seats, either 
alone or in a post-electoral alliance with Monti’s coalition, it was then all but certain. 
In this regard the only one sure thing was the decisive role that the electoral system of 
the Chamber of deputies and especially that of the Senate would play.
The Electoral Systems
The electoral system for the Chamber of deputies is, for the most part but not 
entirely, a proportional system with a majority premium. Indeed, with regard to the 
distribution of the 630 seats, it is necessary to distinguish between three arenas, each 
governed by its own rules. A first arena consists of 26 multi-member constituencies, 
covering the whole national territory, with the exception of the small Valle d’Aosta 
region. Each of the 26 constituencies is assigned a number of seats proportional 
to its resident population, for a total of 617 seats. The second arena consists of the 
single-member district of Valle d’Aosta where the only one seat at stake is allocated 
by plurality voting. Finally, the third arena, contains the ”foreign” constituency of 
Italians living abroad, where 12 seats are distributed using a proportional method. 
The first arena is the most important. Here a mixed ”proportional-plus-majority-
premium” formula is applied. In the first instance, the 617 seats are distributed 
proportionally, at the national level. In order to enter Parliament an independent 
party list has to gather at least 4% of the total valid votes. If a party list is a member 
of a coalition the threshold is lowered to 2%. Coalitions – identified by a leader and 
a common platform – may get seats only if they have at least 10% of valid votes 
and include at least one party list that received equal or more than 2% of the votes. 
Among the party lists which are members of a coalition, the list that received less 
than 2% of the votes, but more votes than any other is also admitted to the allocation 
of seats. Once the seats have been proportionally assigned, it is established whether 
the coalition or independent list with the largest number of votes obtained at least 340 
1 Two other independent lists were also expected to gain a small but significant amount 
of votes, and possibly even some seats. The first was Rivoluzione civile (RC, Civil revolution), 
led by Antonio Ingroia, a former anti-mafia magistrate from Palermo. This list included the 
remnants of the 2008 Sinistra arcobaleno (SA, Rainbow left) and the IDV. The second was Fare per 
fermare il declino (FFD, Act to stop the decline), a liberal democratic party founded and headed 
by the journalist Oscar Giannino.
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seats. If this is not the case, then it triggers assignment of the majority premium which 
”annuls” the purely proportional distribution of seats: the winning coalition or list 
gets 340 seats and the remaining 277 seats are distributed between the other coalitions 
and lists. After the number of seats due to each of the coalitions and independent lists 
has been established, seats are then distributed, for each coalition, among the various 
component lists. Finally, within each of the 26 constituencies, seats are distributed 
first to the coalitions and independent lists, then to the lists belonging to coalitions. 
Candidates are elected according to the order in which they appear on the list.
Thanks to the premium, the electoral system for the Chamber of deputies is 
”majority-assuring”, insofar as the winning coalition or list obtains in any case – and 
therefore independently of the proportion of votes it has obtained – at least 340 seats, 
a number equivalent to about 54% of the total of Chamber seats, and thus more than 
the absolute majority of its members.
The electoral system for the Senate differs from the one for the Chamber with 
regard to the level at which the distribution of seats takes place, the mechanisms for 
assigning the majority premium and the electoral thresholds. 309 seats are distributed 
separately and independently in each of the 20 regions. The majority premium and 
the electoral thresholds are also calculated on a regional base, yet following different 
formulas. In 17 regions all the seats are first assigned by a PR formula. In order to get 
seats an independent party list must have at least 8% of the total valid votes. If a party 
list is a member of a coalition the threshold is lowered to 3%. Coalitions may get seats 
only if they have at least 20% of valid votes and include at least one party list that has 
received equal or more than 3% of the votes. Once the seats have been proportionally 
assigned, if the winning coalition or independent list in the region obtained less 
than 55% of the seats at the regional level, then it receives the majority premium, i.e. 
as many additional seats as are necessary to reach the proportion of 55%, while an 
equivalent number of seats is taken from the other coalitions or independent lists. 
The losers get the rest of 45%. Seats are then distributed, for each coalition, among the 
various lists of which it is composed. Candidates are elected according to the order 
in which they appear on the list. In the remaining 3 regions– Molise, Valle d’Aosta 
and Trentino-Alto Adige – the allocation of seats follows different rules that take into 
account their territorial peculiarities. Finally, other 6 seats are allocated in a ”foreign” 
constituency reserved to Italian residents abroad.
In contrast to what happens in the Chamber, there is no guarantee that the coalition 
or independent list with the largest number of votes nationally obtains an absolute 
majority of the seats in the Senate. Therefore, the electoral system for the Senate is 
not majority assuring. The effects of this crucial difference will become clearer by 
analysing the outcome of the 2013 elections in the two Chambers of Parliament.
The Results
A comprehensive analysis of the election results1 needs to distinguish not only 
between the Chamber and the Senate, but also, for each Chamber of Parliament, 
between the different arenas in which seats are distributed. 
1 For a preliminary analysis of the 2013 elections outcome see also Ilvo DIAMANTI, 
”L’autobus di Grillo nel paese della politica-che-non-c’e`”, available online at www.Repubblica.it, 
13 July 2012.
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The Chamber results given in Table 1 (see the Annex) are thus shown separately 
for the three arenas: the main one, decisive for the allocation of the majority premium, 
the Valle d’Aosta single-member district and the ”foreign” constituency. In the first 
arena, the difference between the center-left (29.6% in total) and the center-right 
(29.2%) was of only 124.958 votes, less than 0.4% of the total of over 34 million valid 
votes. The real surprise was, however, the success of Grillo’s independent list, the 
M5S, that obtained more than 8.5 million votes (25.6%), and turned out to be the 
largest individual party in the ”domestic” arena1. The coalition led by Monti, finally, 
got 10.6% of the valid votes, fewer than many expected. Thanks to the majority 
premium, the tiny advantage of the center-left was transformed into a much larger 
difference in terms of seats: the center-left was assigned 340 (55.1%), the center-right 
124 (20.1%), the M5S 108 (17.5%) and Monti’s coalition 45 (7.3%). The results in the 
”foreign” constituency were also favourable to the center-left, while a candidate of a 
local party won the seat in Valle d’Aosta. Overall, in the Chamber, the final outcome 
of the distribution of seats was such as to give 345 to the center-left (54,8%), 125 to the 
center-right (19.8%), 109 to the M5S (17.3%), 47 to Monti’s coalition (7.5%), and 4 to 
minor party lists.
As far as the Senate election is concerned, Table 2 (see the Annex) shows the 
results of the ”domestic” segment and of the ”foreign” segment separately. Here the 
vote difference between the center-left and the center-right was a little larger than 
in the Chamber: the former coalition got 31.9% of the total votes, while the latter 
30%. In this case, however, unlike in the Chamber, the ”national” plurality of votes 
didn’t trigger the allocation of a majority premium, because the premium was not 
distributed at the national level. Premiums were instead attributed on a regional base, 
to the winning coalitions. The center-left won 11 regions out of 17. The center-right 
won the remaining 6 regions, among which the three with the largest number of seats 
at stake: Lombardy, Campania, and Sicily. The M5S won nowhere. Nevertheless it 
was the first or second best loser in every region. Monti’s list came fourth, but in 
some regions – especially in southern Italy – it didn’t reach the 8% threshold and 
therefore it received no seats. According to the overall result the center-left came out 
first with ”only” 123 seats (39%), against the 117 seats (37.1%) of the center-right, 54 
seats (17.1%) of the M5S, 19 seats (6%) of the Monti’s list, and 2 seats for minor lists. 
This is a result that placed the winning coalition in the Senate far below the threshold 
of an absolute majority and just 6 seats in front of the main opposing coalition. 
The result in the Senate, in other words, made it impossible to form not only a 
center-left majority, but also a post-electoral majority coalition between Bersani’s 
center-left and Monti’s center, which many considered the most likely outcome of these 
elections. In the end, considering that M5S was unavailable for a coalition with the PD, 
the only option left to the PD was to form – under the leadership of Enrico Letta – a 
”grand coalition” cabinet with SC, UDC and, inevitably, with Berlusconi’s PdL.
1 Taking into account the overall distribution of votes, that is the votes cast in the ”foreign” 
constituency included, the PD became the largest individual party with 25.5%, the M5S being 
second with 25.1% (see Table 1 again).
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Vote and Territory
The center-left did not win the elections because it failed to make significant 
electoral gains in those areas where the PdL and its allies have always had their 
strongholds, specifically the North-East and parts of the South. 
In these areas, both the left and the right lost votes, but their relative strength did 
not change, as it is shown in Table 3 (see the Annex). This is what explains Bersani’s 
failure. Though it lost heavily, the left remained the largest coalition in the regions 
of the so-called ”red zone” where its support has deep historical roots1 and where 
it controls local administrations. The right, however, maintained a competitive 
advantage in most of the North and in many parts of the South. The resilience of the 
right in many regions of the country helped Berlusconi to neutralize the majoritarian 
effects of the senatorial electoral system and to create a hung Parliament.
Therefore, one of the most relevant elements emerging from the political elections 
of 2013 is the regression of the two main center-right and center-left parties, PdL and 
PD, with respect to the previous election of 20082. The M5S got 25.6% of the votes, the 
largest share for and individual party list in the domestic segment of the Chamber. 
This is indeed an impressive feat: in the history of the Republic after the elections of 
1946 no new party has ever obtained a similar percentage at its first participation in 
the general elections. The success of Beppe Grillo’s movement, for certain, occurred to 
the detriment of the other main parties, PD and PdL. In fact, Pierluigi Bersani’s party 
went from 33.2% in 2008 to 25.4% in 2013, dropping almost 3.5 million votes along 
the way (i.e. a decrease of 7.8 percentage points). PD decreased in terms of votes in all 
the regions (with the exception of Molise). In this small southern region, PD increased 
of 4.7 percentage points, perhaps retrieving some of the votes of its ally in 2008, the 
IDV (whose leader, Antonio Di Pietro, comes from Molise). The losses for the PD are 
particularly high in Marche (–13.7 percentage points), Basilicata (–12.9), Umbria (–12.3), 
Apulia (–12.5), Lazio (–11.1), Sardinia (–11.0), Abruzzo (–10.9) and Calabria (–10.2). It 
must be emphasized that Marche and Umbria are both regions of the ”red zone”, i.e. 
traditional strongholds of PD. Conversely, the decrease in Lombardy (a conservative 
region from a political standpoint) is particularly small (–2.5 percentage points).
The decrease for Silvio Berlusconi’s PdL has been even more salient, both as a 
percentage and as an absolute value. The PdL indeed went from 37.4% in 2008 down 
to 21.6% in 2013, a decrease of 15.8 percentage points. More than 6 million voters 
abandoned Berlusconi’s party. PdL lost votes in all the regions of the country. These 
1 For a thorough examination of the characteristics of the red sub-culture and of the 
electoral behavior of the regions being part of it, see Carlo BACCETTI, Patrizia MESSINA, 
L’eredità. Le subculture politiche della Toscana e del Veneto, Liviana, Torino, 2009; Ilvo DIAMANTI, 
”Le subculture territoriali sono finite. Quindi (re)esistono”, in Carlo BACCETTI, Silvia 
BOLGHERINI, Renato D’AMICO, Gianni RICCAMBONI (eds.), La politica e le radici, Liviana, 
Torino, 2010, pp. 45-60; Antonio FLORIDIA, ”Le subculture politiche territoriali in Italia: 
epilogo o mutamento?”, in Carlo BACCETTI, Silvia BOLGHERINI, Renato D’AMICO, Gianni 
RICCAMBONI (eds), La politica e le radici, cit., pp. 61-79; and Lorenzo DE SIO (ed.), La politica 
cambia, i valori restano? Una ricerca sulla cultura politica dei cittadini toscani, Florence University 
Press, Firenze, 2011.
2 For an in depth analysis of the 2008 Italian general elections, see Roberto D’ALIMONTE, 
Alessandro CHIARAMONTE (eds.), Proporzionale se vi pare. Le elezioni politiche del 2008, Il 
Mulino, Bologna, 2010.
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losses were particularly high in Sardinia (–22.1 percentage points), Lazio (–20.6), 
Sicily (–20.1), Abruzzo (–17.8) and Basilicata (–17.7). Conversely, the losses registered 
in Trentino Alto Adige (–10.0 percentage points) and Veneto (–8.7) are clearly below 
the national average.
The other new political actor of these elections is Mario Monti’s list (SC), which 
gained almost 3 million votes, representing 8.3% of the total. The performance of SC 
is particularly good (above the national average) in some northern regions: Trentino 
Alto Adige (13.1%), Friuli Venezia Giulia (10.8%), Lombardy (10.7%), Piedmont 
(10.5%) and Veneto (10.1%).
These patterns are similar when we consider not parties, but coalitions. Indeed, 
the two main coalitions lost together nearly 11 million votes. In particular, the center-
right lost a little more than 7 million votes (i.e. a decrease of 17.6 percentage points), 
while the center-left lost more than 3.5 million votes (i.e. a decrease of 8 percentage 
points). Once again, almost half of the center-right’s electorate decided not to vote for 
Silvio Berlusconi’s coalition. In the mirror, the center-left was abandoned by almost 
a fourth of its electorate. This electoral meltdown has involved both coalitions, even 
though the center-right registered the biggest losses, free-falling from 46.8% in 2008 
to 29.2% in 2013. Furthermore, in 2008, the two coalitions together represented 84.4% 
of the total valid votes, while in 2013 they obtained ”only” 58.7%. All this shows that 
the Italian party system1 has entered a restructuring phase2 with increasing electoral 
volatility3.
The center-right lost votes in all regions of Italy, but particularly in Sicily (–23.0 
percentage points), Veneto (–22.7), Liguria (–20.5), Friuli-Venezia Giulia (–19.8), 
Sardinia and Lombardy (–19.4), Piedmont (–18.9). The losses in Piedmont, Lombardy 
and, especially, in Veneto are particularly marked because of the defection of former 
Northern League voters. Conversely, the losses registered in the majority of southern 
regions, and in Umbria and Tuscany, are below the national average. With regard 
to southern regions, the presence of several local lists in the center-right coalition 
partially compensated the losses of the PdL.
In similar fashion, the center-left electoral decline occurs in all the regions in 
Italy (with the exception of Trentino-Alto Adige). The most significant losses, those 
above the national average, were in the southern regions, especially in Molise (–16.7 
percentage points), where it was known that Antonio Di Pietro’s party no longer 
belonged to the coalition. The losses continued in Marche (–14.9 percentage points), 
Abruzzo (–14.3), Umbria (–11.8), Liguria (–11.4), Lazio (–11.8) and Sardinia (–10.8). 
Conversely, the losses registered in Lombardy were below the national average.
1 For an analysis of the evolution of the party system in Italy, see Alessandro CHIARAMONTE, 
”Dal bipolarismo frammentato al bipolarismo limitato? Evoluzione del sistema partitico 
italiano”, in Roberto D’ALIMONTE, Alessandro CHIARAMONTE (eds.), Proporzionale se vi 
pare...cit., pp. 203-228.
2 Luigi CECCARINI, Ilvo DIAMANTI, Marc LAZAR, ”Fine di un ciclo: la destrutturazione 
del sistema partitico italiano”, in Anna BOSCO, Duncan McDONNELL (eds.), Politica in Italia. I 
fatti dell’anno e le interpretazioni. Edizione 2012, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2012, pp. 63-82.
3 For further information on the concept of electoral volatility, see Mogens N. PEDERSEN, 
”The Dynamics of European Party Systems: Changing Patterns of Electoral Volatility”, European 
Journal of Political Research, vol. 7, 1979, pp. 1-26 and Stefano BARTOLINI, ”La volatilità 
elettorale”, Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica, vol. 16, 1986, pp. 363-400.
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The inability of the main political coalitions to gather support may be caused 
by some concurrent phenomena. First, with respect to 2008, the electoral turnout1 
decreased by approximately 5 percentage points (i.e., almost 2.6 million votes). This 
drop is deeper than just the generational turnover (to be estimated at two percentage 
points in the downward). One can therefore hypothesize that a good portion of the 
total votes for the two main coalitions in 2008 ended in abstention in 2013. Moreover, 
the success of M5S consisted mainly in its capacity to obtain votes from the other 
two main center-left and center-right coalitions. Grillo’s party has been able to collect 
votes nationally at a homogeneous level, its relative strongholds being Sicily (33.5%), 
Marche, and Liguria (32.1%). It is important to highlight that both Sicily and Liguria 
are regions where the center-right lost many votes compared to the 2008 elections 
and, at the same time, Marche and Liguria are two regions where the center-left (still 
compared to 2008) suffered losses above the national average. As for the center-left, it 
is important to note that the coalition’s smallest loss was recorded in Lombardy, where 
the M5S only reached 19.6%, the worst percentage obtained by Grillo’s movement 
with the exception of Trentino-Alto Adige (14.6%). The region of the ”red zone” where 
the center-left registered the greatest losses, as we have already seen, is Marche, not 
by chance one of the regions where the M5S was most successful. In general, the M5S 
cuts across the traditional electoral geography, being competitive in all the regions of 
Italy. This means that Grillo’s movement challenged the traditional coalitions in their 
strongholds: the right in the Northeast and in the South (especially in Sicily), the left 
in the ”red zone”. 
Finally, Mario Monti’s coalition, compared to the UDC in 2008, obtained better 
scores, both in absolute terms and in percentage points in all regions except for Sicily, 
where it lost almost 50.000 votes compared to 2008 (–0.8 percentage points). In Sicily, 
Monti and his coalition got 5.9% of the votes in the Senate and failed to have any 
candidates elected. At the national level, the center coalition led by Monti obtained 
almost 3.5 million votes, while the UDC had obtained more than 2 million votes 
by itself in 2008. In the diachronic comparison, it must be pointed out that Monti’s 
coalition showed a territorial distribution of votes notably different from that of the 
UDC in 2008. The regions where it saw a greater increase in percentage points are 
Trentino-Alto Adige (+9.7 percentage points), Lombardy (+7.8), Piedmont (+6.9), 
Friuli-Venezia Giulia (+6.8), Veneto (+6.3), and Liguria (+6.1). The biggest electoral 
growth occurred therefore in these northern regions. In this respect, it is worth noting 
that the regions where Monti’s list did not reach the senatorial electoral threshold of 
8% were all in the center-south: Lazio, Sardinia, Abruzzo, Calabria, and Sicily. 
In sum, these elections mark an evident electoral decline for the two main coali-
tions and parties of the center-left and center-right, both incapable of keeping a 
significant share of their own electorates. The increased electoral volatility2 can be 
explained to a large extent by the growing political disaffection. On the other hand, 
there is now a different competitive dynamic in Italian politics. The old bi-polar 
politics is gone; now there are four (quadri-polar) relevant coalitions or parties. In 
1 For an analysis of the evolution in the Italian electoral turnout, see Dario TUORTO, ”La 
partecipazione al voto”, in Paolo BELLUCCI, Paolo SEGATTI (eds.), Votare in Italia: 1968-2008. 
Dall’appartenenza alla scelta, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2010, pp. 53-79.
2 The total electoral volatility for the 2013 general election is 39.1, calculated based on the 
Pedersen index, Mogens N. PEDERSEN, ”The Dynamics of European Party Systems..cit.”. This 
value is the highest in the history of Italy’s Republic.
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particular, a new political force, the M5S, has been highly competitive and a viable 
and popular choice for many electors who had previously cast their ballot for the 
center-right or center-left in 2008.
The Analysis of the Vote Shifts: 
Where Have Voters Gone?
A useful criterion for understanding the result of the elections is the vote shift. 
Where have the voters of the previous election gone? Who got votes from whom? 
Have some parties suffered more the abstention? These questions are of particular 
importance in an election that saw the affirmation – from scratch – of a new list that 
has obtained a quarter of the valid votes. In order to answer these questions we use 
individual data from the ITANES post-electoral survey, comparing the respondents’ 
vote in 2013 with the memory of their vote in 2008.
Table 4 (see the Annex) gives a matrix of the vote shifts that allows us to appreciate 
both the origins and destinations of votes for all the major parties as well as the area of 
electoral withdrawal/abstention. In addition, the effect of the choices of new voters, 
shown in the last column is also noteworthy.
The matrix shows in the columns the parties of 2008 and in the rows the parties 
of 2013. The political areas of the center-left and center-right are both bordered and 
the coalitions of the 2013 general elections are bordered with a thicker line. Cells 
that correspond to the confirmation in 2013 of the same party voted in 2008 are also 
highlighted in grey, taking into account the splits and the mergers.
A first aspect that deserves to be pointed out is that the share of votes that shifted 
between the two major areas of center-left and center-right is very small (less than 
3% of valid votes). This share is however distributed unevenly between the two 
areas: almost all movements between the two areas (quadrants in the lower left and 
upper right) migrate actually from the center-right to the center-left, and particularly 
towards the PD. The only flow in the opposite direction is a small movement from 
the PD to the PdL, but the overall balance is clearly in favor of the center-left. The 
situation is similar as far as abstention is concerned: if in terms of remobilization of 
voters (third last column) the center-right has done as well as the center-left, this is not 
true in terms of voters’ losses (penultimate row), that indeed hit hard the center-right, 
while leaving unscathed the center-left. These are the shifts that led to the collapse of 
the support for the center-right without leading however to a success of the center-
left. The table shows us the reason why: the affirmation of Civic Choice (SC) and, 
above all, the great success of the M5S. Monti and Grillo drew support from both the 
left and the right. Considering the UDC a party member of the traditional center-right 
political area, it is clear that both SC and M5S had a crosscutting success, though the 
M5S was a little more competitive toward the left and SC toward the right. Monti got 
1.9% of voters from the left and 2.6% of voters from the right, while Grillo 7.8% and 
5.8% respectively. The key point is however that both new parties have been clearly 
perceived as crosscutting the traditional bipolar conflict of the Second Republic, and 
as a result got votes from both the center-left and the center-right. Furthermore, they 
collected votes in the former non-voting area and among young people at their first 
ballot. This is true especially for the M5S: Grillo’s movement is by far the largest party 
among the youngest (penultimate column). 
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The overall picture that emerges from the matrix of vote shifts is ultimately quite 
understandable. First, the electoral crisis of the PdL has been confirmed, even though 
not as much as it appeared at the time of Berlusconi’s resignation. Second, the center-
left showed on the one hand a very limited ability to attract votes from the center-
right, and failed on the other hand to prevent the defection of its voters to the M5S 
and even to SC. 
The Socio-demographic Profile of the Italian Voters
Who are the voters of the main Italian parties from a socio-demographic 
standpoint? In order to answer this question, we use individual data from IPSOS 
pre-election polls. Table 5 (see the Annex) shows the composition of the electorate of 
the main parties by age group and level of education. The M5S has been described in 
the literature as a ”web-populist party”1, but it should be emphasized that it is also a 
party voted by the youngest and most educated sectors of Italian society, according to 
the results reported in the table: 35% of voters aged 18 to 24 voted for it, as well as 29% 
of voters holding a university degree and 31% of high-school graduates. On the other 
end, the M5S attracted only 14% of voters with an elementary education. However, 
the M5S did well not only among the youngest people, but also among the middle-
age respondents. Indeed, 34% of voters aged 35 to 44 voted for it, as well as 32% of 
voters aged 45 to 55. The contrast with the PD and particularly with the PdL is clear-
cut. Only 19% of young people and only 15% of those holding a university degree 
chose the PdL, as opposed to 27% of those with an elementary education. Finally, SC 
voters are overrepresented among those with a university degree. Conversely, LN 
voters are overrepresented among those with an elementary education.
The M5S is also a crosscutting party from a social standpoint (Table 6, see the 
Annex). In terms of employment/non employment status it received more votes than 
the other parties from all the sectors excluding retired people and housewives. Even 
among the self-employed, who have represented for a long time one of the main 
sources of support for the right-wing parties, the M5S did better in 2013 than the PdL 
(39% vs. 20%). On the other end, it is also the party that attracted a higher percentage 
of manual workers, unemployed and students than the PD. The PdL and the PD did 
better than M5S only among housewives (the PdL) and the retired (the PD). The PdL 
obtained percentages of votes above its average also among the unemployed, the 
retired and manual workers. The PD scored above its average in the public sector, 
as usual. SC did well among the entrepreneurs, professionals and managers (13%): 
the bourgeoisie is probably the sector of the Italian society in which Monti’s political 
program attracted votes from the center-right. Finally, LN also has a crosscutting 
profile in terms of employment/non employment status, excluding students among 
which LN is underrepresented.
In conclusion, theM5S shows a crosscutting profile from a socio-demographic 
point of view, with a certain overrepresentation among the youngest and most 
1 Piergiorgio CORBETTA, Elisabetta GUALMINI (eds.), Il partito di Grillo, Il Mulino, 
Bologna, 2013; Fabio BORDIGNON, Luigi CECCARINI, ”5 Stelle, un autobus in MoVimento”, 
Il Mulino, no. 5, 2012, pp. 808-816.
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dynamics sectors of Italian society. The M5S has been compared to a bus1: everybody 
can find something appealing in its program. Nevertheless, the real bond of its 
composite electorate and the main reason of its present success maybe the demand for 
change which runs deep among people regardless their political affiliation or social 
status. This demand has favoured a widespread protest vote that Grillo has been able 
to capture thanks to a ”post-ideological” message, a mobilizing campaign on the web 
and a populist stance against the old establishment. With regard to the other new 
political actor, Monti’s list shows a clear elitist profile: it does well among the most 
educated and in the upper classes. Finally, PD and PdL gained votes especially in the 
sectors outside the labour market. In the long run, this is certainly not good news for 
the main parties of the center-left and of the center-right.
Concluding Remarks
The 2013 vote might be a ”critical election”2, that is an election revealing a sharp 
alteration of the pre-existing voter alignments and creating durable new groupings of 
voters. The following considerations may prove the point.
1) The extraordinary high level of electoral volatility clearly indicates that the 
percentage of voters who switched their preferences in this election was even greater 
than in 1994, at the time of the transition from the First to the Second Republic. 
Actually, in no other case since 1948 we have seen such an electoral change driven by 
a wave of popular dissatisfaction. 
2) In 2013, as in 1994, we have witnessed the emergence of new parties, the most 
important being the M5S. Grillo’s party obtained 8.5 million votes that previously had 
been casted to other parties, or had been lost in abstention. It did so running alone 
against the dominant center-right and center-left coalitions. As a whole, 8 million 
people who had voted for the right and 3.5 million who had voted for the left in 
2008 defected. They went in different directions but very few crossed over to vote for 
the opposite side. The major beneficiary of the defections has been exactly the M5S, 
which explicitly placed itself outside and beyond the left-right political spectrum. 
3) As a result of the electoral change, the concentration of votes on the two 
largest line-ups has been the lowest in the history of the Second Republic. Together, 
the center-left and the center-right coalitions have received only 58.3% of the votes 
for the Chamber and 74.6% of the seats. In 2008 the figures were 84.4% and 93.8% 
respectively. In 2006, 99.1% and 99.8%. In other words, the bipolar structure of the 
Italian party system has now almost collapsed, but it’s not at all clear whether this is 
just a temporary circumstance or the starting point of a new type of party system.
4) For the first time in the Second Republic, elections have been inconclusive. The 
Senate has been left without a real winner. In spite of its poor performance and thanks 
to the electoral system, Berlusconi’s center-right managed to prevent Bersani’s center-
left – the modest winner in the Chamber– from reaching the threshold of absolute 
majority of the seats in the Senate. Post-electoral negotiations between parties of 
1 Fabio BORDIGNON, Luigi CECCARINI, “5 Stelle, un autobus in MoVimento”, cit.; Ilvo 
DIAMANTI, “L’autobus di Grillo nel ... cit.”.
2 V.O. KEY, “A Theory of Critical Elections”, The Journal of Politics, vol. 17, no. 1, 1955, 
pp. 3-18.
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different electoral coalitions and not the ballot, as in the previous elections, have 
consequently been the base for the formation of the new cabinet.
The next general election may be the conclusive evidence of the ”critical” nature of 
the 2013 vote. And, considering the precariousness of the current governing coalition, 
we may not have to wait too long for it.
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